



**2019**

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**Guidance for  
Type Approval of Maritime Cyber  
Security**

## **APPLICATION OF “GUIDANCE FOR TYPE APPROVAL OF MARITIME CYBER SECURITY”**

1. Unless expressly specified otherwise, the requirements in the Guidance apply to cyber-physical systems (hereafter referred to as “cyber systems”) when the application for Type Approval of cyber security onboard ships is dated on or after 1 March 2019.

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# CHAPTER 1 GENERAL

## Section 1 General

### 101. Application

1. This Guidance is to apply to onboard cyber systems including remote access devices, integrated control and monitoring systems, etc.
2. This Guidance defines the security level of cyber system and its requirement according to the level, and the application scope is determined by request of the ship owner.
3. Type approval in accordance with this Guidance is voluntary unless otherwise stated in the Rules for the Classification of Steel Ships(hereafter referred to as "the **Rules for Steel Ships**") and **Guidance for Approval of Manufacturing Process and Type Approval, Etc.**
4. Items not specified in this Guidance are to be in accordance with each relevant requirement in the **Rules for Steel Ships** except for the requirements inapplicable to cyber-physical system.
5. Items not included in this Guidance may comply with ISO, IEC or equivalent recognized standards by the appropriate consideration of the Society.
6. Where the specific requirements in international regulation such as IMO are or as Information technology & operating technology develops, when it deems necessary, additional requirements to this Guidance may be required.

### 102. Definitions

The definitions of terms are to follow the **Rules for Steel ships**, unless otherwise specified in this Guidance.

1. **Authentication** refers to the verification of the claimed identity of an entity.
2. **Authenticator** refers to means used to confirm the identity of an entity.
3. **Authenticity** refers to the quality of records that can be deduced from internal and external evidence, including physical characteristics, structure, content and context of records, in which some records are intact and undamaged.
4. **Authorization** refers to privileges or permissions granted to system objects to access system resources.
5. **Availability** refers to property of ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of system information and functionality.
6. **Component** refers to entity belonging to a system that exhibits the characteristics of one or more of a host device, network device, software application, or embedded device.
7. **Confidentiality** refers to assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized individuals, processes, or device .
8. **Cyber-physical System** refers to an integrated system of computing, networking, and physical processes.
9. **Event** refers to occurrence of or change to a particular set of circumstances.
10. **Forwarder** refers to a network infrastructure device that can safely exchange data streams between controlled networks.
11. **Gateway** refers to a network infrastructure devices used to connect security/controlled networks to security/uncontrolled networks,
12. **Host** refers to general purpose device running an operating system capable of hosting one or more software applications, data stores or functions from one or more suppliers
13. **Integrity** refers to property of protecting the accuracy and completeness of assets.
14. **Interface** refers to a logical entry point that provides access to a module for logical information flow.

15. **Least Privilege** refers to basic principle that holds that users (humans, software processes or devices) should be assigned the fewest privileges consistent with their assigned duties and functions.
16. **Malicious Code** refers to software used or created to disrupt computer operation.
17. **Mobile Code** refers to program transferred between assets that can be executed without explicit installation by the recipient.
18. **Node** refers to a physical device that is connected to a network and has an Internet address.
19. **Non-repudiation** refers to ability to prove the occurrence of a claimed event or action and its originating entities.
20. **Remote Access** refers to access to a component by any user (human, software process or device) communicating from outside the perimeter of the zone being addressed.
21. **Removable External Data Storage (REDS)** source refers to user removable non-network data source, including, but not limited to compact discs, memory sticks and Bluetooth devices.
22. **Secret** refers to A protected information state from being known by a system object except for the purpose of knowing the information.
23. **Security Level** refers to level corresponding to the required set of countermeasures and inherent security properties of devices and systems for a zone or conduit based on assessment of risk for the zone or conduit.
24. **Session** refers to semi-permanent, stateful and interactive information interchange between two or more communicating components.
25. **Switch** refers to a network infrastructure device that is used to interconnect nodes within a network.
26. **Untrusted** refers to not meeting predefined requirements to ensure that an operation, data transaction source, network or software process can be relied upon to behave as expected.
27. **User** refers to individuals, organizational objects, or automated processes that access the system, whether authorized or not.

### 103. Equivalence

Special equipment, which is not appropriate to apply the requirements of this Guidance or not specified in this Guidance, may be accepted by the Society provided that the Society is satisfied that such equipment is equivalent to or above those complying with the requirements of this Guidance.

### 104. Exclusion from the Guidance

The Society cannot assume responsibility for other technical characteristics for cyber-physical systems not covered by this Guidance. However, the Society may advise on such matters upon inquiry. ↓

## CHAPTER 2 TYPE APPROVAL OF CYBER SECURITY

### Section 1 General

#### 101. General

Cyber-physical systems to be applicable in this Guidance are categorized as follows.

- (1) Node : Software application, embedded devices and host devices
- (2) Switch : Network devices
- (3) Forwarder : Network devices, software application and host devices
- (4) Gateway : Network devices, software application and host devices

### Section 2 Procedures for Type Approval

#### 201. Approval application

1. The applicant is, in principle, to be the manufacturer of the cyber-physical system. However, the applicant, where deemed appropriate by the Society, need not always be the manufacturer of the materials and equipment.
2. The manufacturer wishing to obtain a type approval is to submit a copy of the application of type approval of the Society, together with three copies of the required data for approval and two copies of the required data for reference, to the Society. However, the required data previously submitted to the Society, according to the Technical Rules, may be exempted from submission.
3. The Society may require the submission of the data specified in 4., where deemed necessary by the Society.

#### 4. Data for approval

- (1) Functional specifications
- (2) System topology
- (3) System drawings
- (4) List of assets
- (5) Test program related to cyber security
- (6) Manual for user and/or operator
- (7) Risk assessment report

#### 5. Data for reference

- (1) Intercomponent authentication mechanism data

#### 202. Document review

The Society examines the type test program, drawings and data and where deemed appropriate, those are to be approved and returned to the manufacturers.

#### 203. Type test

1. After completion of the document reviews specified in 202., the type tests are to be carried out for the test products in the presence of the Surveyor in accordance with the approved type test program and test method as deemed appropriate by the Society.
2. Products which have been failed to pass the type tests specified in 1. should not be retested without revision of drawings and/or specifications. If, following analysis of the experimental data from tests, it is found that the failure of type tests have been caused by the poor test conditions, etc., retest without revision may be permitted subject to the Society's approval.
3. In principle, the type tests are to be carried out at the manufacturing sites. However, the test may be done outside of manufacturing sites subject to the Society's approval.
4. The type tests may be partly or wholly omitted, subject to the approval by the Society, in cases where the manufacturer has been approved by other Classification Society or an inspection organ-

ization recognized by the Society.

5. After completion of the type tests, the manufacturer is to submit three copies of the test records to the Society.

#### 204. Plant audit

This is to comply with the requirements in **Ch 3 105. of Guidance for Approval of Manufacturing Process and Type Approval, Etc.** Where type approval of equipment is carried out simultaneously or already done, plant audit may be omitted.

#### 205. Notification and announcement of approval

This is to comply with the requirements in **Ch 3 106. of Guidance for Approval of Manufacturing Process and Type Approval, Etc.**

#### 206. Changes in the approved contents

This is to comply with the requirements in **Ch 3 107. of Guidance for Approval of Manufacturing Process and Type Approval, Etc.**

#### 207. Validity and renewal of approval certificate

1. The approval certificate will be valid within three years from the date of issue. In case where the approval certificate is renewed in accordance with the requirements specified in the preceding **206.**, the expiration date will not be changed.
2. This is to comply with the requirements in **Ch 3 108. of Guidance for Approval of Manufacturing Process and Type Approval, Etc.** However, the renewed approval certificate will be valid within three years from the expiry date of old approval certificate.

#### 208. Confirmation test and/or occasional plant audit

This is to comply with the requirements in **Ch 3 109. of Guidance for Approval of Manufacturing Process and Type Approval, Etc.**

#### 209. Suspension or withdrawal of approval

This is to comply with the requirements in **Ch 3 110. of Guidance for Approval of Manufacturing Process and Type Approval, Etc.** ↓

## CHAPTER 3 REQUIREMENTS FOR CYBER SECURITY

### Section 1 General

#### 101. General

1. Security levels are defined as:
  - (1) **Security level(SL) 1** is a level protecting against casual or coincidental violation.
  - (2) **Security level(SL) 2** is a level protecting a system against intentional violation using simple means, low resources, low motivation
  - (3) **Security level(SL) 3** is a level protecting a system against intentional violation using sophisticated means, moderate resources, moderate motivation.
  - (4) **Security level(SL) 4** is a level protecting a system against intentional violation using sophisticated means, extended resources, high motivation.
2. Unless expressly specified otherwise, in order for a component to comply with high security level requirements, it should comply with all of the lower security level requirements.

### Section 2 Identification and authentication

#### 201. Human user identification and authentication

1. Components should provide the capability to identify and authenticate all human users according to **ISA 62443-4-2 CR 1.1** on all interfaces capable of human user access.
2. User identification and authentication should not hamper fast, local emergency actions.
3. Components should provide the capability to employ multifactor authentication for all human user access to the component.
4. Components should provide the capability to uniquely identify and authenticate all human users.
5. **Requirements for SLs**
  - (1) SL 1 : **201. 2**
  - (2) SL 2 : **201. 3**
  - (3) SL 3 : **201. 4**
  - (4) SL 4 : **201. 4**

#### 202. Software process and device identification and authentication

1. Components should provide the capability to identify itself and authenticate to any other component (software application, embedded devices, host devices and network devices), according to **ISA 62443-4-2 CR 1.2**.
2. Components should provide the capability to uniquely identify and authenticate itself to any other component.
3. **Requirements for SLs**
  - (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
  - (2) SL 2 : **202. 1**
  - (3) SL 3 : **202. 2**
  - (4) SL 4 : **202. 2**

#### 203. Account management

1. Components should provide the capability to support the management of all accounts directly or integrated into a system that manages accounts according to **ISA 62443-4-2 CR 1.3**.
2. **Requirements for SLs**
  - (1) SL 1 : **203. 1**

- (2) SL 2 : **203. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **203. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **203. 1**

#### **204. Identifier management**

1. Components should provide the capability to integrate into a system that supports the management of identifiers and/or provide the capability to support the management of identifiers directly according to **ISA 62443-4-2 CR 1.4**.

##### **2. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : **204. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **204. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **204. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **204. 1**

#### **205. Authenticator management**

1. Components should provide the capability to:
  - (1) support the use of initial authenticator content;
  - (2) support the recognition of changes to default authenticators made at installation time;
  - (3) function properly with periodic authenticator change/refresh operation; and
  - (4) protect authenticators from unauthorized disclosure and modification when stored, used and transmitted.
2. The authenticators on which the component rely should be protected via hardware mechanisms like OTP memory.

##### **3. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : **205. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **205. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **205. 2**
- (4) SL 4 : **205. 2**

#### **206. Strength of password-based authentication**

1. For components that utilize password-based authentication, those components should provide or integrate into a system that provides the capability to enforce configurable password strength according to internationally recognized and proven password guidelines.
2. Components should provide, or integrate into a system that provides, the capability to enforce password minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions for all users.
3. Components should provide, or integrate into a system that provides, the capability to protect against any given human user account from reusing a password for a configurable number of generations. In addition, the component should provide the capability to enforce password minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions for human users. These capabilities should conform to commonly accepted security industry practices.
4. Components should provide the capability to prompt the user to change their password upon a configurable time prior to expiration.

##### **5. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : **206. 2**
- (2) SL 2 : **206. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **206. 3**
- (4) SL 4 : **206. 4**

#### **207. Public key infrastructure certificates**

1. When public key infrastructure (PKI) is utilized, the component should provide or integrate into a system that provides the capability to interact and operate in accordance with **ISA 62443-4-2 CR 1.8**.

## 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **207. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **207. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **207. 1**

## 208. Strength of public key-based authentication

1. For components that utilize public-key-based authentication, those components should provide directly or integrate into a system that provides the capability within the same environment to:
  - (1) validate certificates by checking the validity of the signature of a given certificate;
  - (2) validate the certificate chain or, in the case of self-signed certificates, by deploying leaf certificates to all hosts that communicate with the subject to which the certificate is issued;
  - (3) validate certificates by checking a given certificate's revocation status;
  - (4) establish user (human, software process or device) control of the corresponding private key;
  - (5) map the authenticated identity to a user (human, software process or device); and
  - (6) ensure that the algorithms and keys used for the public key authentication comply with **503**.
2. Components should provide the capability to protect critical, long-lived private keys via hardware mechanisms.

## 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **208. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **208. 2**
- (4) SL 4 : **208. 2**

## 209. Authenticator feedback

1. When a component provides an authentication capability the component should provide the capability to obscure feedback of authenticator information during the authentication process.

## 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **209. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **209. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **209. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **209. 1**

## 210. Unsuccessful login attempts

1. When a component provides an authentication capability the component should provide the capability to enforce a limit of a configurable number of consecutive invalid access attempts by any user (human, software process or device) during a configurable time period and deny access for a specified period of time or until unlocked by an administrator when this limit has been reached.

## 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **210. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **210. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **210. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **210. 1**

## 211. System use notification

1. When a component provides local human user access/HMI, it should provide the capability to display a system use notification message before authenticating. The system use notification message should be configurable by authorized personnel.

## 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **211. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **211. 1**

- (3) SL 3 : **211. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **211. 1**

## **212. Strength of symmetric key-based authentication**

1. For components that utilize symmetric keys, the component should provide the capability to:
  - (1) establish the mutual trust using the symmetric key
  - (2) store securely the shared secret (the authentication is valid as long as the shared secret remains secret)
  - (3) restrict access to the shared secret
  - (4) ensure that the algorithms and keys used for the symmetric key authentication comply with **503**.
2. Components should provide the capability to protect critical, long lived symmetric keys via hardware mechanisms.

### **3. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **212. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **212. 2**
- (4) SL 4 : **212. 2**

## **Section 3 Use Control**

### **301. Authorization enforcement**

1. Components should provide an authorization enforcement mechanism for all identified and authenticated users based on their assigned responsibilities.
2. Components should provide an authorization enforcement mechanism for all users based on their assigned responsibilities and least privilege.
3. Components should, directly or through a compensating security mechanism, provide for an authorized role to define and modify the mapping of permissions to roles for all human users.
4. Components should support a supervisor manual override for a configurable time or sequence of events.
5. Components should support dual approval when action can result in serious impact on the industrial process. However, dual approval mechanisms should not be employed when an immediate response is necessary to safeguard health, safety and environment consequences, for example, emergency shutdown of an industrial process

### **6. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : **301. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **301. 3**
- (3) SL 3 : **301. 4**
- (4) SL 4 : **301. 5**

### **302. Wireless use**

1. If a component supports usage through wireless interfaces it should provide the capability to integrate into the system that supports usage authorization, monitoring and restrictions according to commonly accepted industry practices.

### **2. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : **302. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **302. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **302. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **302. 1**

### 303. Session lock

1. If a component provides a human user interface, whether accessed locally or via a network, the component should provide the capability
  - (1) to protect against further access by initiating a session lock after a configurable time period of inactivity or by manual initiation by the user (human, software process or device); and
  - (2) for the session lock to remain in effect until the human user who owns the session, or another authorized human user, re-establishes access using appropriate identification and authentication procedures.
2. Requirements for SLs
  - (1) SL 1 : **303. 1**
  - (2) SL 2 : **303. 1**
  - (3) SL 3 : **303. 1**
  - (4) SL 4 : **303. 1**

### 304. Remote session termination

1. If a component supports remote sessions, the component should provide the capability to terminate a remote session either automatically after a configurable time period of inactivity, manually by a local authority, or manually by the user (human, software process or device) who initiated the session.
2. Requirements for SLs
  - (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
  - (2) SL 2 : **304. 1**
  - (3) SL 3 : **304. 1**
  - (4) SL 4 : **304. 1**

### 305. Concurrent session control

1. Components should provide the capability to limit the number of concurrent sessions per interface for any given user (human, software process or device).
2. Requirements for SLs
  - (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
  - (2) SL 2 : Not applicable
  - (3) SL 3 : **305. 1**
  - (4) SL 4 : **305. 1**

### 306. Auditable events

1. Components should provide the capability to generate audit records relevant to security for the following categories:
  - (1) access control
  - (2) request errors
  - (3) system events
  - (4) backup and restore event
  - (5) configuration changes
  - (6) audit log events
2. Individual audit records should include:
  - (1) timestamp
  - (2) source (originating device, software process or human user account)
  - (3) category
  - (4) type
  - (5) event ID
  - (6) event result

### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **306. 2**
- (2) SL 2 : **306. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **306. 2**
- (4) SL 4 : **306. 2**

### 307. Audit storage capacity

1. Components should provide the capability to allocate audit record storage capacity according to commonly recognized recommendations for log management and provide mechanisms to protect against a failure of the component when it reaches or exceeds the audit storage capacity.
2. Components should provide the capability to issue a warning when the allocated audit record storage reaches a configurable threshold.

### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **307. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **307. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **307. 2**
- (4) SL 4 : **307. 2**

### 308. Response to audit processing failures

1. Components should provide the following capability to protect against the loss of essential services and functions in the event of an audit processing failure and to support appropriate actions in response to an audit processing failure according to commonly accepted industry practices and recommendations.

### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **308. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **308. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **308. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **308. 1**

### 309. Timestamps

1. Components should provide the capability to create timestamps (including date and time) for use in audit records.
2. Components should provide the capability to create timestamps that are synchronized with a system wide time source.
3. The time synchronization mechanism should provide the capability to detect unauthorized alteration and cause an audit event upon alteration.

### 4. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **309. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **309. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **309. 2**
- (4) SL 4 : **309. 3**

### 310. Non-repudiation

1. If a component provides a human user interface, the component shall provide the capability to determine whether a given human user took a particular action. Elements that are not able to support such capability shall be listed in component documents.
2. Components shall provide the capability to determine whether a given user (human, software process or device) took a particular action.

### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **310. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **310. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **310. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **310. 2**

### 311. REDS security

1. The number of connection points for REDS such as USB should be limited to the absolute minimum required for the operation of the system and its lifetime maintenance and support.
2. Connection points should be physically blocked from easy access by a user without a tool or key.
3. Connection points should limit their operation to permitting connection only to data sources.
4. All automatic execution at a node from REDS including USB auto-run should be prohibited. Manual execution should be possible only for the files which are verified before execution, using digital signature or special keys.

### 5. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **311. 4**
- (2) SL 2 : **311. 4**
- (3) SL 3 : **311. 4**
- (4) SL 4 : **311. 4**

## Section 4 System Integrity

### 401. Communication integrity

1. Components should provide the capability to protect integrity of transmitted information.
2. Components should provide the capability to verify the authenticity of received information during communication.

### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **401. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **401. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **401. 2**
- (4) SL 4 : **401. 2**

### 402. Security functionality verification

1. Components should provide the capability to support verification of the intended operation of security functions according to **ISA 62443-4-2 CR 3.3**.
2. Components should provide the capability to support verification of the intended operation of security functions during normal operations.

### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **402. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **402. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **402. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **402. 2**

### 403. Software and information integrity

1. Components should provide the capability to perform or support integrity checks on software, configuration and other information as well as the recording and reporting of the results of these checks or be integrated into a system that can perform or support integrity checks.
2. Components should provide the capability to perform or support authenticity checks on software,

configuration and other information as well as the recording and reporting of the results of these checks or be integrated into a system that can perform or support authenticity checks.

3. If the component is performing the integrity check, it should be capable of automatically providing notification to a configurable entity upon discovery of an attempt to make an unauthorized change.

#### 4. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **403. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **403. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **403. 3**
- (4) SL 4 : **403. 3**

### 404. Input validation

1. Components should validate the syntax, length and content of any input data that is used as an industrial process control input or input via external interfaces that directly impacts the action of the component.

#### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **404. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **404. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **404. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **404. 1**

### 405. Deterministic output

1. Components that physically or logically connect to an automation process should provide the capability to set outputs to a predetermined state if normal operation as defined by the component supplier cannot be maintained.

#### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **405. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **405. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **405. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **405. 1**

### 406. Error handling

1. Components should identify and handle error conditions in a manner that does not provide information that could be exploited by adversaries to attack the components.

#### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **406. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **406. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **406. 1**

### 407. Session integrity

1. Components should provide mechanisms to protect the integrity of communications sessions including:

- (1) the capability to invalidate session identifiers upon user logout or other session termination (including browser sessions)
- (2) the capability to generate a unique session identifier for each session and recognize only session identifiers that are system-generated
- (3) the capability to generate unique session identifiers with commonly accepted sources of randomness

#### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **407. 1**

- (3) SL 3 : 407. 1
- (4) SL 4 : 407. 1

#### 408. Protection of audit information

1. Components should protect audit information, audit logs, and audit tools (if present) from unauthorized access, modification and deletion.
2. Components should provide the capability to store audit records on hardware-enforced write-once media.

##### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : 408. 1
- (3) SL 3 : 408. 1
- (4) SL 4 : 408. 2

## Section 5 Data Confidentiality

#### 501. Communication integrity

1. Components should provide the capability to protect the confidentiality of information at rest for which explicit read authorization is supported and support the protection of the confidentiality of information in transit as defined in **ISA 62443-4-2 CR 4.1**.

##### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : 501. 1
- (2) SL 2 : 501. 1
- (3) SL 3 : 501. 1
- (4) SL 4 : 501. 1

#### 502. Information persistence

1. Components should provide the capability to erase all information, for which explicit read authorization is supported, from components to be released from active service and/or decommissioned.
2. Components should provide the capability to protect against unauthorized and unintended information transfer via volatile shared memory resources.
3. Components should provide the capability to verify that the erasure of information occurred.

##### 4. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : 502. 1
- (3) SL 3 : 502. 3
- (4) SL 4 : 502. 3

#### 503. Use of cryptography

1. If cryptography is required, the component should use cryptographic security mechanisms according to internationally recognized and proven security practices and recommendations.

##### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : 503. 1
- (2) SL 2 : 503. 1
- (3) SL 3 : 503. 1
- (4) SL 4 : 503. 1

## Section 6 Restricted Data Flow

### 601. Network segmentation

1. Components should support a segmented network to support zones and conduits, as needed, to support the broader network architecture based on logical segmentation and criticality.

#### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **601. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **601. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **601. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **601. 1**

### 602. Loop prevention

1. The switch should provide a loop prevention mechanism for example RSTP, MSTP. Network topology and switch configuration should support its convergence within 5 s.

#### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **602. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **602. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **602. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **602. 1**

## Section 7 Timely Response to Events

### 701. Audit log accessibility

1. Components should provide the capability for authorized humans and/or tools to access audit logs on a read-only basis.
2. Components should provide programmatic access to audit records by either using an application programming interface (API) or sending the audit records to a centralized system.

#### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **701. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **701. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **701. 2**
- (4) SL 4 : **701. 2**

### 702. Continuous monitoring

1. Components should provide the capability to be continuously monitored using commonly accepted security industry practices and recommendations to detect, characterize and report security breaches in a timely manner.

#### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **702. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **702. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **702. 1**

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## Section 8 Resource Availability

### 801. Denial of service(DoS) protection

1. Components should provide the capability to maintain essential functions when operating in a degraded mode as the result of a DoS event.
2. Components should provide the capability to mitigate the effects of information and/or message flooding types of DoS events.

#### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **801. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **801. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **801. 2**
- (4) SL 4 : **801. 2**

### 802. Resource management

1. Components should provide the capability to limit the use of resources by security functions to protect against resource exhaustion.

#### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **802. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **802. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **802. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **802. 1**

### 803. System backup

1. Components should provide the capability to participate in system level backup operations in order to safeguard the component state (user- and system-level information). The backup process should not affect the normal component operations.
2. Components should provide the capability to validate the integrity of backed up information prior to the initiation of a restore of that information.

#### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **803. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **803. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **803. 2**
- (4) SL 4 : **803. 2**

### 804. System recovery and reconstitution

1. Components should provide the capability to be recovered and reconstituted to a known secure state after a disruption or failure.

#### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **804. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **804. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **804. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **804. 1**

### 805. Network and security configuration settings

1. Components should provide the capability to be configured according to recommended network and security configurations as described in guidelines provided by the system supplier. The component should provide an interface to the currently deployed network and security configuration settings.
2. Components should provide the capability to generate a report listing the currently deployed security settings in a machine-readable format.

### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **805. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **805. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **805. 2**
- (4) SL 4 : **805. 2**

### 806. Least functionality

1. Components should provide the capability to specifically restrict the use of unnecessary functions, ports, protocols and/or services.

#### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **806. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **806. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **806. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **806. 1**

### 807. System component inventory

1. Components should provide the capability to support a system component inventory according to **ISA 62443-3-3 SR 7.8.**

#### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **807. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **807. 1**
- (4) SL 4 : **807. 1**

## Section 9 Software Application

### 901. Mobile code

1. In the event that a software application utilizes mobile code technologies, that application should provide the capability to enforce a security policy for the usage of mobile code technologies. The security policy should allow, at a minimum, the following actions for each mobile code technology used on the software application:

- (1) Control execution of mobile code
- (2) Control which users (human, software process, or device) are allowed to transfer mobile code to/from the application
- (3) Control the execution of mobile code based on the results of an integrity check prior to the code being executed

2. The application should provide the capability to enforce a security policy that allows the device to control execution of mobile code based on the results of an authenticity check prior to the code being executed.

#### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **901. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **901. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **901. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **901. 2**

### 902. Protection from malicious code

1. The application product supplier should qualify and document which protection from malicious code mechanisms are compatible with the application and note any special configuration requirements.

## 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **902. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **902. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **902. 1**
- (3) SL 4 : **902. 1**

## Section 10 Embedded Device Requirements

### 1001. Mobile code

1. In the event that an embedded device utilizes mobile code technologies, the embedded device should provide the capability to enforce a security policy for the usage of mobile code technologies. The security policy should allow, at a minimum, the following actions for each mobile code technology used on the embedded device:
  - (1) Control execution of mobile code
  - (2) Control which users (human, software process, or device) are allowed to transfer mobile code to the device
  - (3) Control the execution of mobile code based on the results of an integrity check prior to the code being executed
2. The embedded device should provide the capability to enforce a security policy that allows the device to control execution of mobile code based on the results of an authenticity check prior to the code being executed.

### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **1001. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **1001. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **1001. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1001. 2**

### 1002. Use of physical diagnostic and test interfaces

1. Embedded devices should protect against unauthorized use of the physical factory diagnostic and test interface(s).
2. Embedded devices should provide active monitoring of the device's diagnostic and test interface(s) and generate an audit log entry when attempts to access these interface(s) are detected.

### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **1002. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1002. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1002. 2**

### 1003. Protection from malicious code

1. The embedded device should provide the capability to protect from installation and execution of unauthorized software.

### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **1003. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1003. 1**
- (3) SL 4 : **1003. 1**

### 1004. Support for updates

1. The embedded device should support the ability to be updated and upgraded.

2. The embedded device should validate the authenticity and integrity of any software update or upgrade prior to installation.

### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **1004. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **1004. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **1004. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1004. 2**

## 1005. Physical tamper resistance and detection

1. The embedded device should provide tamper resistance and detection mechanisms to protect against unauthorized physical access into the device.
2. The embedded device should be capable of automatically providing notification to a configurable set of recipients upon discovery of an attempt to make an unauthorized physical access. All notifications of tampering should be logged as part of the overall audit logging function.

### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **1005. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1005. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1005. 2**

## 1006. Provisioning product supplier roots of trust

1. Embedded devices should provide the capability to provision and protect the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of product supplier keys and data to be used as one or more “roots of trust” at the time of manufacture of the device.

### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **1006. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1006. 1**
- (3) SL 4 : **1006. 1**

## 1007. Physical tamper resistance and detection

1. Embedded devices should provide the capability to provision and protect the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of asset owner keys and data to be used as “roots of trust”; and support the capability to provision without reliance on components that may be outside of the device’s security zone.

### 2. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **1007. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1007. 1**
- (3) SL 4 : **1007. 1**

## 1008. Integrity of the boot process

1. Embedded devices should verify the integrity of the firmware, software, and configuration data needed for the component’s boot and runtime processes prior to use.
2. Embedded devices should use the component’s product supplier roots of trust to verify the authenticity of the firmware, software, and configuration data needed for the component’s boot process prior to it being used in the boot process.

### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **1008. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **1008. 2**

- (3) SL 3 : **1008. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1008. 2**

## Section 11 Host Device Requirements

### 1101. Mobile code

1. In the event that a host device utilizes mobile code technologies, that host device should provide the capability to enforce a security policy for the usage of mobile code technologies. The security policy should allow, at a minimum, the following actions for each mobile code technology used on the host device:
  - (1) Control execution of mobile code
  - (2) Control which users (human, software process, or device) are allowed to upload mobile code to the host device
  - (3) Control the code execution based upon integrity checks on the mobile code and prior to the code being executed.
2. The embedded device should provide the capability to enforce a security policy that allows the device to control execution of mobile code based on the results of an authenticity check prior to the code being executed.

#### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **1101. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **1101. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **1101. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1101. 2**

### 1102. Use of physical diagnostic and test interfaces

1. Embedded devices should protect against unauthorized use of the physical factory diagnostic and test interface(s).
2. Embedded devices should provide active monitoring of the device's diagnostic and test interface(s) and generate an audit log entry when attempts to access these interface(s) are detected.

#### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **1102. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1102. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1102. 2**

### 1103. Protection from malicious code

1. To provide protection from malicious codes, there should be a mechanism for host device qualified by the product supplier. The product supplier should document special configuration requirements related to protection against malicious codes.
2. Host device should automatically report malware protection software and file version in use (as part of the full logging function).
3. The embedded device shall provide the capability to protect from installation and execution of unauthorized software.

#### 4. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **1103. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **1103. 3**
- (3) SL 3 : **1103. 3**
- (3) SL 4 : **1103. 3**

**1104. Support for updates**

1. The embedded device should support the ability to be updated and upgraded.
2. The embedded device should validate the authenticity and integrity of any software update or upgrade prior to installation.

**3. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : **1104. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **1104. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **1104. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1104. 2**

**1105. Physical tamper resistance and detection**

1. The embedded device should provide tamper resistance and detection mechanisms to protect against unauthorized physical access into the device.
2. The embedded device should be capable of automatically providing notification to a configurable set of recipients upon discovery of an attempt to make an unauthorized physical access. All notifications of tampering should be logged as part of the overall audit logging function.

**3. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **1105. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1105. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1105. 2**

**1106. Provisioning product supplier roots of trust**

1. Host devices should provide the capability to provision and protect the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of product supplier keys and data to be used as one or more “roots of trust” at the time of manufacture of the device.

**2. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **1106. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1106. 1**
- (3) SL 4 : **1106. 1**

**1107. Provisioning asset owner roots of trust**

1. Host devices should provide the capability to provision and protect the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of asset owner keys and data to be used as “roots of trust” and support the capability to provision without reliance on components that may be outside of the device’s security zone.

**2. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **1107. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1107. 1**
- (3) SL 4 : **1107. 1**

**1108. Integrity of the boot process**

1. Host devices should verify the integrity of the firmware, software, and configuration data needed for component’s boot process prior to it being used in the boot process.
2. Host devices should use the component’s product supplier roots of trust to verify the authenticity of the firmware, software, and configuration data needed for component’s boot process prior to it being used in the boot process.

### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **1108. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **1108. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **1108. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1108. 2**

## Section 12 Network Device Requirements

### 1201. Wireless access management

1. A network device supporting wireless access management should provide the capability to identify and authenticate all users (humans, software processes or devices) engaged in wireless communication.
2. The network device should provide the capability to uniquely identify and authenticate all users (humans, software processes or devices) engaged in wireless communication.

### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **1201. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **1201. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **1201. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1201. 2**

### 1202. Access via untrusted networks

1. The network device supporting device access into a network should provide the capability to monitor and control all methods of access to the network device via untrusted networks.
2. The network device should provide the capability to deny access requests via untrusted networks unless explicitly approved by an assigned role.

### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **1202. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **1202. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1202. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1202. 2**

### 1203. Mobile code

1. In the event that a network device utilizes mobile code technologies, the network device should provide the capability to enforce a security policy for the usage of mobile code technologies. The security policy should allow, at a minimum, the following actions for each mobile code technology used on the network device:
  - (1) Control execution of mobile code
  - (2) Control which users (human, software process, or device) are allowed to transfer mobile code from the network device
  - (3) Control the code execution based upon integrity checks on mobile code and prior to the code being executed
2. The network device should provide the capability to enforce a security policy that allows the device to control execution of mobile code based on the results of an authenticity check prior to the code being executed.

### 3. Requirements for SLs

- (1) SL 1 : **1203. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **1203. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **1203. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1203. 2**

**1204. Use of physical diagnostic and test interfaces**

1. Network devices should protect against unauthorized use of the physical factory diagnostic and test interface(s).
2. Network devices should provide active monitoring of the device's diagnostic and test interface(s) and generate an audit log entry when attempts to access these interface(s) are detected.

**3. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **1204. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1204. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1204. 2**

**1205. Protection from malicious code**

1. The network device should provide for protection from malicious code.

**2. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : **1205. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **1205. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1205. 1**
- (3) SL 4 : **1205. 1**

**1206. Support for updates**

1. Network devices should support the ability to be updated and upgraded.
2. Network devices should validate the authenticity and integrity of any software update or upgrade prior to installation.

**3. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : **1206. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **1206. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **1206. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1206. 2**

**1207. Physical tamper resistance and detection**

1. Network devices should provide tamper resistance and detection mechanisms to protect against unauthorized physical access into the device.
2. Network devices should be capable of automatically providing notification to a configurable set of recipients upon discovery of an attempt to make an unauthorized physical access. All notifications of tampering should be logged as part of the overall audit logging function.

**3. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **1207. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1207. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1207. 2**

**1208. Provisioning product supplier roots of trust**

1. Network devices should provide the capability to provision and protect the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of product supplier keys and data to be used as one or more "roots of trust" at the time of manufacture of the device.

**2. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **1208. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1208. 1**
- (3) SL 4 : **1208. 1**

**1209. Provisioning asset owner roots of trust**

1. Network devices should provide the capability to provision and protect the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of asset owner keys and data to be used as “roots of trust” and support the capability to provision without reliance on components that may be outside of the device’s security zone.

**2. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : Not applicable
- (2) SL 2 : **1209. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1209. 1**
- (3) SL 4 : **1209. 1**

**1210. Integrity of the boot process**

1. Network devices should verify the integrity of the firmware, software, and configuration data needed for component’s boot process prior to it being used in the boot process.

2. Network devices should use the component’s product supplier roots of trust to verify the authenticity of the firmware, software, and configuration data needed for component’s boot process prior to it being used in the boot process.

**3. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : **1210. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **1210. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **1210. 2**
- (3) SL 4 : **1210. 2**

**1211. Zone boundary protection**

1. A network device at a zone boundary should provide the capability to monitor and control communications at zone boundaries to enforce the compartmentalization defined in the risk-based zones and conduits model.

2. The network component should provide the capability to deny network traffic by default and allow network traffic by exception.

3. The network component should provide the capability to protect against any communication through the system boundary (also termed island mode).

4. The network component should provide the capability to protect against any communication through the system boundary when there is an operational failure of the boundary protection mechanisms (also termed fail-close).

**5. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : **1211. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **1211. 2**
- (3) SL 3 : **1211. 4**
- (3) SL 4 : **1211. 4**

**1212. General purpose, person-to-person communication restrictions**

1. A network device at a zone boundary should provide the capability to protect against general purpose, person-to-person messages from being received from users or systems external to the system.

**2. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : **1212. 1**
- (2) SL 2 : **1212. 1**
- (3) SL 3 : **1212. 1**
- (3) SL 4 : **1212. 1**

**1213. Network access control**

1. Each connected node to a network, if installed outside of a secure area, should be authorized by its MAC address and physically connected to a port at a switch or forwarder.
2. If a connected node is intended to be installed in a secure area means should be provided to enable or disable the authorization by MAC address.
3. All bypassing and originating traffic at a switch and forwarder should be authorized by IP address and UDP/TCP port number.

**4. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : **1213. 3**
- (2) SL 2 : **1213. 3**
- (3) SL 3 : **1213. 3**
- (3) SL 4 : **1213. 3**

**1214. Direct communication**

1. When direct communication is required to equipment in a network, permission from an administrator or supervisor should be required together with monitoring during the entire communication period.
2. By manufacturing default, direct connection from an uncontrolled network should be set to not allowed.
3. Direct connection with a node from an uncontrolled network should only be activated by an operation on the installation site or the network side of the firewall.

**4. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : **1214. 3**
- (2) SL 2 : **1214. 3**
- (3) SL 3 : **1214. 3**
- (3) SL 4 : **1214. 3**

**1215. Wireless connection**

1. Wireless gateway should be operated only as a client.
2. Traffic forwarding from the wireless network to 460-Network should not be allowed.
3. All data exchanged through a wireless interface should meet the encryption requirement
4. Wireless connection should be established only to registered wireless AP(s) with authentication.

**5. Requirements for SLs**

- (1) SL 1 : **1215. 4**
- (2) SL 2 : **1215. 4**
- (3) SL 3 : **1215. 4**
- (3) SL 4 : **1215. 4** ⚓

## ANNEX 1 MAPPING THE REQUIREMENTS TO TYPES OF DEVICE

The table below maps requirements for type approval of cyber security to types of equipment.

**Table 3 Cyber security requirements in accordance with types of equipment**

Requirements	Node	Switch	Forwarder	Gateway
<b>Identification and authentication control</b>				
201. Human user identification and authentication	0	0	0	0
202. Software process and device identification and authentication	0	0	0	0
203. Account management	0	0	0	0
204. Identifier management	0	0	0	0
205. Authenticator management	0	0	0	0
206. Strength of password-based authentication	0	0	0	0
207. Public key infrastructure certificates	0	0	0	0
208. Strength of public key-based authentication	0	0	0	0
209. Authenticator feedback	0	0	0	0
210. Unsuccessful login attempts	0	0	0	0
211. System use notification	0	0	0	0
212. Strength of symmetric key-based authentication	0	0	0	0
<b>Use control</b>				
301. Authorization enforcement	0	0	0	0
302. Wireless use control	0	0	0	0
303. Session lock	0	0	0	0
304. Remote session termination	0	0	0	0
305. Concurrent session control	0	0	0	0
306. Auditable events	0	0	0	0
307. Audit storage capacity	0	0	0	0
308. Response to audit processing failures	0	0	0	0
309. Timestamps	0	0	0	0
310. Non-repudiation	0	0	0	0
311. REDS Security	0	0	0	0
<b>System integrity</b>				
401. Communication integrity	0	0	0	0
402. Security functionality verification	0	0	0	0
403. Software and information integrity	0	0	0	0
404. Input validation	0	0	0	0
405. Deterministic output	0	0	0	0
406. Error handling	0	0	0	0
407. Session integrity	0	0	0	0
408. Protection of audit information	0	0	0	0
<b>Data confidentiality</b>				
501. Information confidentiality	0	0	0	0
502. Information persistence	0	0	0	0
503. Use of cryptography	0	0	0	0
<b>Restricted data flow</b>				
601. Network segmentation	X	0	0	0
602. Loop prevention	X	0	X	X
<b>Timely response to events</b>				
701. Audit log accessibility	0	0	0	0
702. Continuous monitoring	X	X	0	0

Table 1 Cyber security requirements in accordance with types of equipment

<b>Resource availability</b>				
801. Denial of service protection	O	O	O	O
802. Resource management	O	O	O	O
803. System backup	O	O	O	O
804. System recovery and reconstitution	O	O	O	O
805. Network and security configuration settings	O	O	O	O
806. Least functionality	O	O	O	O
807. System component inventory	O	O	O	O



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## **GUIDANCE FOR TYPE APPROVAL OF MARITIME CYBER SECURITY**

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